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En este artículo defendemos el punto de vista de que los mecanismos están respal-
dados por redes de relaciones que establecen diferencias. En primer lugar, distinguimos y 
criticamos dos tipos diferentes de argumentos a favor de entender los mecanismos a par-
tir de la noción de actividad: un enfoque que prioriza metafísica (Glennan) y otro que 
prioriza la ciencia (Illari y Williamson). En segundo lugar, presentamos un punto de vista 
alternativo de los mecanismos entendiéndolos en términos del establecimiento de dife-
rencias y lo ilustramos examinando un caso histórico: la prevención del escorbuto. Usa-
mos este ejemplo para argumentar que la evidencia a favor de un mecanismo no algo 
distinto a la evidencia a favor de relaciones que establecen diferencias. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we defend the view that mechanisms are underpinned by networks of 
difference-making relations. First, we distinguish and criticise two different kinds of ar-
guments in favour of an activity-based understanding of mechanism: Glennan’s meta-
physics-first approach and Illari and Williamson’s science-first approach. Second, we 
present an alternative difference-making view of mechanism and illustrate it by looking at 
the history of the case of scurvy prevention. We use the case of scurvy to argue that evi-
dence for a mechanism just is evidence for difference-making relations. 
 





Causal relations are explanatory. If C causes E then C explains the 
occurrence of E. Mechanisms are widely taken to be both what makes a 
relation causal and what makes causes explanatory. So, typically, if one 
explains the occurrence of event E by citing its cause C, i.e., if one as-
serts that C brings about E or that E occurs because of C, one is ex-
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pected to cite the mechanism that links the cause and the effect: it is in 
virtue of the intervening mechanism that C causes E and hence that C 
causally explains E. On this account of causation, it is not enough to 
show that E depends on C — where dependence should be taken to be 
robust, e.g., a difference-making relation. Unless there is a mechanism, 
there is no causation. Difference-making is taken to be enough for predic-
tion and control but not enough for explanation [cf. Williamson (2011)].  
Now, when it comes to causation there are two competing views 
available: production and dependence [cf. Psillos (2004)]. On the pro-
duction account, C causes E iff C produces E. ‘Production’ is a term of 
art, of course, with heavily causal connotations. The typical way to ac-
count for ‘production’ is by means of mechanism. So, C produces E iff 
there is a mechanism that links C and E. On the dependence account, C 
causes E iff C makes a difference to E. This difference-making is typical-
ly seen as counterfactual dependence, viz., if C hadn’t happened, then E 
wouldn’t have occurred. As is well-known, both views face problems and 
counterexamples. For instance, the production account cannot accom-
modate causation by absences. The lack of water caused the plant to die, 
but there is no mechanism linking the absence of water with death. The 
difference-making account cannot accommodate cases of overdetermi-
nation and pre-emption. For instance, suppose that two causes act inde-
pendently of each other to produce an effect. There is certainly 
causation, but no difference-making since the effect would be produced 
even in the absence of each one of the causes [cf. Williamson (2011)]. 
The key aim of the present paper is to defend the view that 
difference-making is more fundamental than production in unders-
tanding mechanistic causation. In particular, we shall argue that 
mechanisms are best understood as networks of difference-making 
relations. To do this, we shall criticise the popular idea that the 
productivity of mechanisms requires commitments to activities, 
qua a sui generis ontic category. There are two routes to this popu-
lar view, one top-down and another bottom up. The top-down 
approach, most ably defended by Stuart Glennan (2017), is the me-
taphysics-first approach. On this view, in order to account for 
what mechanisms are as things in the world, activities must be posited 
as a distinctive metaphysical item. Activities are taken to be com-
ponents of mechanisms, distinct from entities and their properties, 
and are supposed to account for what makes a mechanism produc-
tive. The bottom-up approach, recently defended by Phyllis Illari 
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and John Williamson (2011), is the science-first approach. On this 
view in order to account for the pervasive role of mechanisms in 
science, and in particular, for the fact that mechanisms are (spatio-
temporally) localised, we have to think of mechanisms as embo-
dying activities. Sections II and III respectively will argue against 
both approaches to activities. Section II will show that there is no 
need to hypostatise activities over and above the properties and re-
lations of things that make up causal pathways; section III will 
show that the ‘local’ argument for activities does not make a case 
for an activities-based understanding of mechanisms.  
Section IV will revisit activities, this time as part of a productive 
account of causation. It will be argued that the very idea of produc-
tion requires difference-making relations. Finally, in section V we will 
look in some detail at the history of the case of scurvy prevention. 
This case will drive home the point that it is enough to understand 
mechanisms as underpinned by relations of difference-making. 
 
 
II. AGAINST ACTIVITIES 1 
 
What is a mechanism? Glennan puts forward what he calls Minimal 
Mechanism: “a mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or 
parts) whose activities and interactions are organised in such a way that 
they are responsible for the phenomenon” [Glennan (2017), p. 13]. 
Though minimal, this account is “an expansive conception of what a 
mechanism is” [Ibid. p. 106], mostly because it involves commitment to 
activities as a novel ontological category. “Activities” Glennan claims 
“(…) cannot naturally be reduced to properties of or relations between 
entities” [Ibid. p. 50].1  
Given that activities play a key role in the mechanistic accounts of 
causation, it’s important to be clear on what they are supposed to be. 
Here then are some characteristics of activities, according to Glennan. 
Activities are concrete: “they are fully determinate particulars located 
somewhere in space and time; they are part of the causal structure of the 
world [Ibid. p. 20]. Activities are the ontic correlate of verbs. They include 
anything from walking, to pushing, to bonding (chemically or romantically) 
to infecting. Given this, activities “are a kind of process — essentially in-
volving change through time” [Ibid. p. 20]. Some activities are non-
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relational (unary activities) since they involve just one entity, e.g., a solitary 
walk. But some activities involve interactions: they are non-unary activities, 
viz., activities which implicate more than one entity [Ibid. p. 21].  
Most activities, Glennan says, “just are mechanistic processes”, i.e., 
spatio-temporally extended processes which “bring about changes in the 
entities involved in them” [Ibid. p. 29]. What, then, is a mechanistic pro-
cess? According to Glennan, “To call a process mechanistic is to empha-
sise how the outcome of that process depends upon the timing and 
organisation of the activities and interactions of the entities that make up 
the process” [Ibid. p. 26]. 
Now, it appears that there is a rather tight circle here. A process is 
mechanistic when the entities that make it up engage in activities. But if 
activities just are mechanistic processes, then a process is mechanistic when 
the entities that make it up engage in mechanistic processes. Not much 
illumination is achieved. Perhaps, however, Glennan’s point is that ac-
tivities and processes are so tightly linked that they cannot be understood 
independently of each other. Yet, there seems to be a difference—
activities (are meant to) imply action. To describe something as an activi-
ty is to imply that something acts or that an action takes place. A process 
need not involve action. It can be seen as a (temporal or causal) sequence 
of events. In fact, it might be straightforward to just equate the mecha-
nism with the process, viz., the causal pathway that brings about an ef-
fect. In the sciences all kinds of processes are characterised as 
mechanistic irrespective of whether they are ‘active’ or not. Let us illus-
trate this point by a brief discussion of the case of active vs passive 
membrane transport, which are the two mechanisms of transporting 
molecules across the cell membrane. The transportation of the molecules 
takes place across a semi-permeable phospholipid bilayer and is deter-
mined by it. Some molecules (small monosaccharides, lipids, oxygen, 
carbon dioxide) pass freely the membrane through a concentration gra-
dient whereas other molecules (ions, large proteins) pass the membrane 
against the concentration gradient and use cellular energy. The main dif-
ference between active and passive transport is precisely that in active 
transport the molecules are pumped using ATP energy whereas in the 
passive transport the molecules pass through the gradient by diffusion or 
osmosis. These different mechanisms play different roles. Active 
transport is required for the entrance of large, insoluble molecules into 
the cell, whereas passive transport allows the maintenance of a homeo-
stasis between the cytosol and extracellular fluid. But they are both causal 
processes or pathways, even though only one of them is ‘active’. 
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Glennan (2017), p. 32, takes it that “the most important feature of 
activities” is that most or all activities are mechanism-dependent. This, 
he thinks, suggests that “the productive character of activities comes 
from the productive relations between intermediates in the process, and 
that the causal powers of interactors derive from the productive relations 
between the parts of those interactors”.  
But this is not particularly illuminating. Apart from the fact that 
production is itself an activity, to explain the productive character of ac-
tivities by reference to the productive activity of intermediaries, or of the 
constituent parts of the mechanism, just pushes the issue of the produc-
tivity of an activity A to the productivity of the constituent activities 
A1,…, An of the mechanism that realises A. Far from explaining how 
activities are productive, it merely assumes it. Now, Glennan takes an ex-
tra step. He takes it that some producings are explained “in terms of 
other producings, not in terms of some non-causal features such as regu-
larity, or counterfactual dependence” [Ibid. p. 33]. In the context in 
which we are supposed to try to understand what distinguishes activities 
from non-activities, this kind of argument is simply question-begging.  
If what makes entities engage in activities are their properties and 
relations to other entities in what sense are activities things distinct from 
them? In what sense are activities “a novel ontological category”? Here, 
we find Glennan’s argument perplexing. His chief point is that thinking 
of activities as fixed by the properties and relations of things “reduces 
doing to having; it takes the activity out of activities” [Ibid. p. 50]. The 
language of relations “is a static language” [Ibid.]. But activities, we are 
told, are “dynamic” [Ibid. p. 51].  
Let us set aside this figurative distinction between doing and hav-
ing. After all, it is in virtue of having mass that bodies gravitationally at-
tract each other, according to Newton’s theory of gravity. More 
generally, it is by virtue of having properties that things stand in relations 
to each other, some of which are ‘static’ e.g., being taller than, while oth-
ers are ‘dynamic’, e.g., being attracted by. To see why activities do not 
add something novel to ontology, let us stress that for Glennan activities 
are fully concrete particulars: “Any particular activity in the world will be 
fully concrete, though our representations of that activity may be more 
or less abstract” [Ibid. pp. 95-96]. Now, if activities are always particular, 
and if they are always specific, like pushings, pullings, bondings, infect-
ings, dissolvings, diffusings, pumpings etc. there is no need to think of 
them as comprising a novel ontic category. For each fully concrete activi-
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ty, there will be some account in terms of entities, their properties and 
relations. A pushing is an event (or a process) which consists in an object 
changing its position (over time) due to the impact by another body. In-
deed, the very event itself consists in a change of the properties of a thing 
(or of its relations to other things). Similarly, for other concrete activities: 
there will always be some description of the event or the process in-
volved by reference to the changes of the properties of a thing (that en-
gage in the ‘activity’) or to the relations with other things.  
Take the case of a mechanism such as the formation of a chemical 
bond. Chemical bonding refers to the attraction between atoms. It allows 
the formation of substances with more than one atomic component and 
is the result of the electromagnetic force between opposing charges. At-
oms are involved in the formation of chemical bonds in virtue of their 
valence electrons. There are mainly two types of chemical bonds: ionic 
and covalent. Ionic bonds are formed between two oppositely charged 
ions by the complete transfer of electrons. The covalent bond is formed 
by the complete transfer of valence electrons between bonded atoms. 
Such type of bond is formed by the equal sharing of electrons between 
two bonded atoms. These atoms have equal contribution to the for-
mation of the covalent bond. On the basis of the polarity of a covalent 
bond, it can be classified as a polar or non-polar covalent bond. Electro-
negativity is the property of an atom in virtue of which it can attract the 
shared electrons in a covalent bond. In nonpolar covalent bonds, the at-
oms have similar EN. Differences in EN yield bond polarity. 
In describing this mechanism, there was no need to think of particu-
lar activities as anything other than events (sharing of electrons) or pro-
cesses (transfer of valence electrons) that are fixed by the properties of 
atoms (their valence electrons; Electronegativity) and the relations they 
stand to each other (similar or different EN).  
Glennan, however, takes it that “processes are collections of entities 
acting and interacting through time” [Ibid. p. 57]. Elsewhere [Ibid. p. 83], 
he notes that a mechanism is a “sequence of events (which will typically 
be entities acting and interacting)”. If we were to follow Bishop Berke-
ley’s advice to ‘think with the learned and speak with the vulgar’ we could 
grant this talk in terms of activities, without hypostatising activities over 
and above the properties and relations by virtue of which entities ‘act 
and interact’. We conclude that ‘activity’ is an abstraction without onto-
logical correlate. 
When he talks about entities, Glennan takes it that a general charac-
teristic of entities is this: “The causal powers or capacities of entities are 
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what allow them to engage in activities and thereby produce change” 
[Ibid. p. 33]. What produces the change? It seems Glennan’s dualism re-
quires that there are causal powers and activities and that the former ena-
ble the entities that possess them to engage in activities, thereby producing 
changes (to other entities). It’s as if the activities exist out there ready to be 
engaged with by entities having suitable causal powers. Glennan is ada-
mant: “activities are not properties or relations; they are things that an enti-
ty or entities do over some period of time” [Ibid. p. 96]. 
But this cannot be right. The activities cannot exist independently 
of the entities and their properties (whether we conceive of them as 
powers or not). What activities an entity can ‘engage with’ depends on 
the properties of this entity. Water can dissolve salt but not iron, to offer 
a trivial example. The ‘activities’ an entity can engage in are none others 
than those that result from the kind of entity it is. If you assume powers, 
as Glennan does, then the activities of an entity are fixed by the manifes-
tation of its powers (given suitable circumstances). Given a power ontol-
ogy, the powers are the producers of change; the activities are merely the 
manifestation of powers.  
As Glennan admits: “The central difference between activities and 
powers is that activities are actual doings, while powers express capacities 
or dispositions not yet manifested” [Ibid. p. 32]. As just noted, assuming 
particulars with powers, activities are the manifestation/exercising of 
these powers. When a cube of salt is put in water, it dissolves. The dis-
solving is the manifestation (assuming a power-ontology) of the active 
power of water to dissolve (water-soluble) materials and the passive 
power of the salt to get dissolved. The dissolving takes time (and hence it 
is a process); but it is not acting in any sense; it does not produce any 
changes in the salt; it consists in the changes in the salt. The ‘scraping of 
the skin off the carrot’ (Glennan’s example) is the removal of the skin of 
the carrot (at least on this particular occasion) and hence it does not 
cause (or produce) the removal. Activities do not produce anything; they 
are the productions (of effects).  
 
 
III. AGAINST ACTIVITIES 2 
 
While Glennan’s motivation for activities comes from the meta-
physics of mechanisms, other philosophers vouch for activities on the 
grounds that science requires them. The general motivation appears to 
60                                                           Stathis Psillos and Stavros Ioannidis 
teorema XXXVIII/3, 2019, pp. 53-75 
be that science must constrain metaphysics. Not only is it the case that 
what there is has to be compatible with what science describes, but also 
the best route to the fundamental structure of the world should be the 
descriptions that science offers. Thus, proponents of activities have ar-
gued that if we take seriously the descriptions offered in such fields as 
molecular biology or neurobiology, we find that activities are central in 
these descriptions [Machamer, Darden & Craver (2000); Illari & William-
son (2013)]. lllari & Williamson, in particular, think that “[t]here is a good 
argument from the successful practice of the biological sciences for the 
appeal to activities in the characterisation of a mechanism” [Illari & Wil-
liamson (2013), p. 71].  
Illari & Williamson (2011) offer a bottom-up argument in favour of 
what they call an ‘active metaphysics’ for the workings of mechanisms, 
by which they mean a metaphysics in terms of capacities [cf. Cartwright 
(1989)] or of powers [cf. Gillett (2006)] or of activities [cf. Machamer, 
Darden & Craver (2000)]. They contrast active metaphysics with ‘pas-
sive’ metaphysics, which characterises the working of mechanisms in 
terms of laws or counterfactuals. In what follows we are going to exam-
ine this kind of bottom-up argument, which we are going to call the ‘lo-
cal argument’. 
Although we are here treating the local argument as an argument in 
favour of activities, Illari & Williamson take the argument to be more 
general, as it does not differentiate between activity-based and power-
based views. In fact, in their (2013) Illari & Williamson offer reasons to 
prefer an ontology based on entities and activities over an ontology 
based on entities and capacities, a main reason being that an ontology of 
activities is more parsimonious. But since these arguments are largely 
metaphysical, and we are here focusing on bottom-up arguments, we are 
going to examine the local argument in its general form.  
Illari & Williamson argue that biological practice, and in particular 
the fact that mechanisms are taken to be explanatory, constrains the on-
tology of mechanisms. More specifically, they think that a metaphysics of 
mechanisms that views within-mechanism interactions in terms of laws 
or counterfactuals, is “in tension with the actual practice of mechanistic 
explanation in the sciences, which examines only local regions of 
spacetime in constructing mechanistic explanations.” So, passive ap-
proaches do not “allow mechanisms to be real and local (…) only active 
approaches give a local characterisation of a mechanism” [Illari & Wil-
liamson (2013), p. 835]. They think then that the local argument estab-
lishes that a characterisation of mechanism has to be given in terms of an 
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active metaphysics and not in terms of “counterfactual notions grounded 
in laws or other possible worlds” [Ibid. p. 838]. 
The local argument can be reconstructed as follows:  
 
The practice of mechanistic explanation requires that mecha-
nisms be local (1). This in turn implies that a characterisation of 
mechanism has to be local (2).  
But only a metaphysics of powers or activities is a local meta-
physics (3).  
So, a local characterisation of mechanism requires a metaphys-
ics based on powers or activities (4) (2013, 834-838).  
 
In response to this argument for an ‘active’ metaphysics of mechanisms, 
it seems to us that ‘local’ cannot have the same meaning in premises (1) 
and (2), on the one hand, and in premise (3), on the other: we can have 
local mechanisms without a local metaphysics. There are three points to 
note here. 
First, it is certainly true that mechanisms are local to the phenome-
na they produce. In this context, ‘local’ means that mechanistic explana-
tion involves the localisation of the parts into which the mechanism is 
decomposed, the operations of which produce the phenomenon for 
which the mechanism is responsible. Indeed, as Bechtel & Richardson 
(2010) have argued, localisation is a central strategy in constructing a 
mechanistic explanation: scientists decompose the phenomenon under 
study into component operations, and “localise them within the parts of 
the mechanism” [Ibid Introduction, p. XXX]. But then, localisation of 
parts can fully capture the sense in which mechanisms are ‘local’, without 
entailing a ‘local’ metaphysics, which is supposed to underlie a character-
isation of the interactions among components, and not only the compo-
nents themselves. Even if we accept a metaphysics of laws, within-
mechanism interactions are interactions between ‘local’ components. 
Second, it is not at all easy to account for within-mechanism inter-
actions in terms of a ‘local’ metaphysics. Energy transformations in bio-
logical systems obey the laws of thermodynamics. But it is very difficult 
to reconcile a power ontology with what it seems to be a global principle, 
like the law of conservation of energy. This is something that friends of 
powers themselves have recognised [cf. Ellis (2001)]. So, contra Illari & 
Williamson, a focus on practice seems in fact to imply the opposite con-
clusion: global principles like the laws of thermodynamics are needed for 
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accounting for within-mechanism interactions (e.g. as studied by bioen-
ergetics, cf. Nelson et al (2008), p. 489); but only a metaphysics in terms 
of laws seems to offer an adequate account of such global principles; so, 
a metaphysics of laws is required for a characterisation of the metaphys-
ics of mechanisms. Again, the point here is that ‘local’ decompositions of 
mechanistic parts must be kept distinct from ‘global’ or ‘local’ ways to 
characterise interactions. 
Third, there is a historical point to be made against the argument 
that mechanistic explanation is not compatible with a metaphysics of 
laws. This combination (‘local’ mechanisms that produce phenomena 
plus laws of nature) was a dominant view in 17th century mechanical 
philosophy. Contemporary mechanistic explanations, of course, are very 
different from their 17th century counterparts, which in many cases just 
involved parts of matter in motion. But the general pattern of explana-
tion is similar: in giving a mechanistic explanation, one shows how the 
particular properties of the parts, their organisation and their interactions 
(which can be captured in terms of the laws that govern them), produce 
the phenomena.  
In view of the previous points, premise (3) above can only be ac-
cepted if the meaning of ‘local’ is disambiguated. An option here is to say 
that mechanisms have to be local, in the sense that within-mechanism in-
teractions have to be grounded in facts in the vicinity of the mechanism. 
So, one can think of causation as a local matter, i.e. as a relation between 
the two events that are causally connected, and not as a global matter, i.e. 
as involving a regularity. But note that so-called singular causation is 
compatible with a metaphysics of laws. One can view causation as a rela-
tion between ‘local’ events, but at the same time adopt an ontology of 
laws, where laws could be, for example, necessitating relations between 
universals, or humean regularities, i.e. ‘global’ facts about the universe 
[cf. Ioannidis & Psillos (2018)]. 
Note that Illari & Williamson themselves seem to recognise that in 
understanding scientific practice one need not talk about metaphysics, for 
they say: “Understanding the metaphysics of mechanisms on this level is 
now a philosophical problem with no immediate bearing on scientific 
method, of course” [Illari & Williamson (2011), p. 834]. But they add: “It 
does, however, bear on our understanding of science” [Ibid. p. 834]. While 
we agree with the first sentence, we believe (and we shall argue below) 
that an understanding of mechanism as causal pathways, underpinned by 
difference-making relations is all one needs in order to understand scien-
tific practice. We conclude, then, that there is no reason coming from 
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scientific practice for accepting a power-based or an activities-based ac-
count of mechanism. 
 
 
IV. CAUSATION AS PRODUCTION 
 
This last point, viz., that difference-making relations are enough to 
understand mechanisms and hence mechanistic causation and explana-
tions, is contested. Many philosophers take it that causation is produc-
tion. Glennan, for instance, is one of the defenders of this view. 
According to him, mechanisms, qua productive, are the truth-makers of 
causal claims: 
 
(MC) A statement of the form ‘Event c causes event e’ will be true 
just in case there exists a mechanism by which c contributes to the 
production of e [Glennan (2017), p. 156]. 
 
Actually, there are as many causal relations as there are activities. As he 
puts it: “There is on this view [the new mechanist view] no one thing 
which is interacting or causing, and when we characterise something as a 
cause, we are not attributing to it a particular role in a particular relation, 
but only saying that there is some productive mechanism, consisting of a 
variety of concrete activities and interactions among entities” [Ibid. p. 
148]. This pluralist view leads him to the radical conclusion that “There 
is (…) no such thing as THE ontology or THE epistemology of THE 
causal relation, but only more localised accounts connected with the par-
ticular kinds of producing” [Ibid. p. 33].  
MC tallies with Glennan’s singularism about causation. All causings 
are singular and in fact fully distinct from each other. Singularism is 
committed to the view that causation is internal (intrinsic, as Glennan 
puts it) to its relata. Glennan shares this intuition. He says: “Productive 
causal relationships are singular and intrinsic. They involve continuity 
from cause to effect by means of causal processes” [Ibid. p. 154]. 
But is causation a relation, after all? And if yes, what are the relata? 
Events, is the answer that springs to mind. Glennan agrees but takes 
events to involve activities: “Events are particulars — happenings with 
definite locations and durations in space and time. They involve specific 
individuals engaging in particular activities and interactions” [Ibid. p. 
149]. Or as he put it elsewhere: “an event is just one or more entities en-
gaging in an activity or interaction” [Ibid. p. 177]. 
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We have already argued in section 2 that activity is far from being a 
sui generis ontic category. Besides, there is the received account of 
events as property-exemplifications: events are exemplifications of prop-
erties (or relations) by an object (or set of objects) at a time (or a period 
of time). As Glennan admits: “If exemplifying a property were the same 
as engaging in an activity, then the two views would coincide”. However, 
he takes it that “there are important differences between exemplifying 
properties and engaging in activities” [Ibid. p. 177]. 
The chief difference between property-exemplification and engaging 
in activities is, Glennan says, that “properties are paradigmatically syn-
chronic states of an entity that belong to that entity for some time.” Unlike 
activities, properties “do not involve change”. Events, Glennan argues, 
“involve changes”. It is indeed true that events involve change. The colli-
sion of the Titanic with the iceberg took time and during it, both the Ti-
tanic and the iceberg suffered changes in their properties, which resulted in 
another event, viz. the sinking of the Titanic. It is true that to account for 
this we have to introduce relations: the collision is between the Titanic and 
the iceberg. But relations, we are told, are not “activity-like”. Glennan in-
sists: “only events (which involve activities) can be causally productive”. 
Properties, he says, “cannot produce anything” [Ibid. p. 178]. 
When all is said and done, the key question is: is causation produc-
tion? Or is it difference-making? Glennan is clear: “While I grant that 
production and relevance are two different concepts of cause, I will ar-
gue that production is fundamental” [Ibid. p. 156]. 
Descriptively, Glennan distinguishes between three kinds of pro-
ductive relations: 
 
• Constitutive production: An event produces changes in the enti-
ties that are engaging in the activities and interactions that consti-
tute the event. 
 
• Precipitating production: An event contributes to the production 
of a different event by bringing about changes to its entities that 
precipitate a new event. 
• Chained production: An event contributes to the production of 
another event via a chain of precipitatively productive events 
[Ibid. p. 179]. 
 
All this is fine but what is the chief argument for causation being production? 
It seems to be this: “Mechanisms provide the ontological ground-
ing that allows causes to make a difference” [Glennan (2017), p. 165]. 
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Glennan’s problem with the claim that mechanism is itself a network of 
relations of difference-making between events is that on the difference- 
making account “the causal claim depends upon the truth of a counter-
factual, whereas on the mechanist account the truth depends upon the 
existence of an actual mechanism” [Ibid. p. 167]. Furthermore, it is 
claimed that the truth of the counterfactual requires contrasting an actual 
situation — where the cause occurs — and a non-actual but possible sit-
uation in which the cause does not occur.  
Does the production account avoid counterfactuals? Glennan 
acknowledges that causation as production relies on some notion of rel-
evance but takes this to require actual difference-makers. He takes it that 
actual difference-makers are “features of the actual entities and their ac-
tivities upon which outcome depends” [Ibid. p. 203]. 
What is an actual difference-maker? A factor such that had it not 
happened, the effect would not have followed. But a) in an actual con-
crete sequence of events which brought about an effect x, all events were 
necessary in the circumstances; all were difference-makers. If any of 
them were absent, the effect, in its full concrete individuality, would not 
follow. A different effect would have followed. But b) what makes true 
the counterfactual that ‘had x not actually happened, y would not have 
followed’? To ‘delete’ x from the actual sequence is to envisage a coun-
terfactual sequence (that is, a distinct sequence of events) without x. It is 
then to compare two sequences: the actual and the counterfactual. This 
requires thinking in terms of counterfactual difference-making. What 
makes the counterfactual true is not the actual sequence of events but 
the fact, if it is a fact, that xs are followed by ys, which is a causal law. 
Take the example of a ball striking a window while a canary nearby 
sings. The actual causal situation — the mechanism in all its particularity 
— includes the process of the acoustic waves of the canary’s singing strik-
ing the window (say, for convenience, at the moment when the ball 
strikes the window) as well as the kinetic energy of the ball (which was a 
red cricket ball) etc. Despite the fact that the acoustic waves are part of 
the actual concrete mechanism and clearly contributed to the actual 
breaking (no matter how little), we would not say that it was the singing 
that caused the window-breaking. It clearly didn’t make a substantial 
contribution to the breaking. Had it not been there, the window would 
still have shattered. How can this counterfactual be made true by the ac-
tual situation? In the actual situation, the singing was a difference-maker 
since it was part of the mechanism that made the difference. To show 
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that it did not make a difference (better put, that it made a difference 
without a difference) we have to compare the actual situation in which 
the singing took place and a non-actual but possible situation in which 
the singing did not happen. Whatever makes this counterfactual true, it is 
not the actual situation, in and of itself. 
Not only production does not avoid counterfactuals (if actual dif-
ference-makers are to be shown that did not make a difference) but it 
seems that the very idea of production requires difference-making rela-
tions if the producer of change is nothing more specific than everything 
that happened before the effect took place. 
 
 
V. CAUSATION AS DIFFERENCE-MAKING: THE CASE OF SCURVY 
 
Given the difficulties with activities and the mechanistic production 
outlined above, it seems more promising to start with difference-making 
and give an account of mechanisms in terms of it. Such difference-
making accounts of mechanism have been offered by various authors. 
For James Woodward (2002), difference-making is required to account 
for within-mechanism interactions. As he puts it, “components of mech-
anisms should behave in accord with regularities that are invariant under 
interventions and support counterfactuals about what would happen in 
hypothetical experiments” [Woodward (2002), p. 374]. Peter Menzies 
(2012) uses the interventionist approach to causation to give an account 
of the causal structure of mechanisms.  
More recently, Gillies (2017) and Ioannidis & Psillos (2017; 2018) 
have offered difference-making accounts of mechanism by discussing 
particular case-studies. Common to both of these more recent accounts 
is the thought that a mechanism in life sciences should be viewed as a 
causal pathway connecting a cause with a particular effect. Gillies sums 
up his account as follows: “Basic mechanisms in medicine are defined as 
finite linear sequences of causes (C1 → C2 → C3 → … → Cn), which 
describe biochemical/ physiological processes in the body. This defini-
tion corresponds closely to the term ‘pathway’ often used by medical re-
searchers. Such basic mechanisms can be fitted together to produce 
more complicated mechanisms which are represented by networks” 
[Gilles (2017), p. 633].  
In our (2017; 2018) we have argued that when scientists talk about 
a ‘mechanism’, what they try to capture is the way (i.e. the causal path-
way) a certain result is produced. Suppose, for instance, that pathologists 
want to find out how a certain disease is brought about. They look for a 
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specific mechanism, i.e. a causal pathway that involves various causal 
links between, for example, a virus and changes in properties of the or-
ganism that ultimately lead to the disease. In pathology, such causal 
pathways constitute the pathogenesis of a disease, and when pathologists 
talk about the mechanisms of a disease, it is such pathways that they 
have in mind [cf. Lakhani et al (2009)]. This leads to the following view: 
“[t]o identify a mechanism … is to identify a specific causal pathway that 
connects an initial ‘cause’ (the causal agent) with a specific result” [Psillos 
and Ioannidis (2017), p. 604]. So, mechanisms in biomedicine are “stable 
causal pathways, described in the language of theory” [Ibid. (2018), p. 
1181], where to identify a causal pathway is to identify difference‐making 
relations among its components.  
Moreover, we have argued that in giving a characterisation of 
mechanism as a concept of scientific practice, one need not be commit-
ted to a specific view on the metaphysics of mechanisms: mechanism in 
our sense is a concept used in scientific practice and as such it is primari-
ly a methodological concept. An important point here is that if we take 
this truly minimal account of mechanisms, then the burden is on the de-
fender of a particular metaphysical characterisation of mechanism to say 
why such a methodological account is not enough and why it should be 
inflated with metaphysical categories (such as entities and activities). 
To motivate further this difference-making account of mechanism, 
as well as the view that difference-making is prior to production, let us 
look briefly at the case of scurvy. This, we now know, is a disease resulting 
from a lack of vitamin C (ascorbic acid). If you think of it, the absence of 
vitamin C in an organism causes scurvy, which starts with relatively mild 
symptoms (weakness, feeling tired, and sore arms and legs) and if it re-
mains untreated it may lead to death. If we take seriously the thought that 
absences, qua causes, are counterexamples to mechanistic causation, we 
should conclude that there is no mechanistic explanation of scurvy. But 
this would be clearly wrong. What is correct to say is that the lack of vita-
min C disrupts various biosynthetic causal pathways, that is, mechanisms, 
e.g., the synthesis of collagen. In the latter process, ascorbic acid is re-
quired as a cofactor for two enzymes (prolyl hydroxylase and lysyl hydrox-
ylase) which are responsible for the hydroxylation of collagen. Some 
tissues such as skin, gums, and bones contain a greater concentration of 
collagen and thus are more susceptible to deficiencies. But ascorbic acid is 
also required in the enzymatic synthesis of dopamine, epinephrine, and 
carnitine. Now, humans are unable to synthesise ascorbic acid, the reason 
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being that humans possess only 3 of the 4 enzymes needed to synthesise it; 
(the fourth enzyme seems to be defective). Hence humans have to take vit-
amin C through their diet [for a useful survey cf. Magiorkinis et al. (2011)].  
The disrupted causal pathways that prevent scurvy can be easily ac-
commodated within the difference-making account of causation. Had vit-
amin C been present in the organism x, x wouldn’t have developed scurvy. 
In fact, the very causal pathway can be seen as a network of relations of 
dependence (or difference-making). Abstractly put, had vitamin C been 
present in human organism x, x’s lack of working GULO enzyme would 
not have mattered; enzymes prolyl hydroxylase and lysyl hydroxylase 
would have been produced etc. and scurvy would have been prevented. 
[For a description of the causal pathways of the synthesis of vitamin C in 
the mammals that can synthesise it, see Linster & Van Schaftingen (2007)]. 
The history of scurvy is really interesting. During the Age of Explo-
ration (between 1500 and 1800), it has been estimated that scurvy killed 
at least two million seamen. Although there were hints that scurvy is due 
to dietary deficiencies, it was not until 1747 that it was shown that scurvy 
could be treated by supplementing the diet with citrus fruits. In what is 
taken as the first controlled clinical trial reported in the history of medi-
cine, James Lind, naval surgeon on HMS Salisbury, took 12 patients with 
scurvy “on board the Salisbury at sea” [Lind (1753), p. 149]. As he re-
ported, “Their cases were as similar as I could have them”. The patients 
were kept together “in one place, being a proper apartment for the sick” 
and had “one diet in common to all”. He then divided them to 6 groups 
of 2 patients and each of which was allocated to 6 different daily treat-
ments for a period of 14 days. One group was administered 2 oranges 
and 1 lemon per day for 6 days only, “having consumed the quantity that 
could be spared” [Ibid. p.150]. The other groups were administered cy-
der, elixir vitriol, vinegar, sea-water, and a concoction of various herbs, 
all of which were supposed to be anti-scurvy remedies. As Lind put it: 
“The consequence was that the most sudden and visible good effects 
were perceived from the use of the oranges and lemons; one of those 
who had taken them being at the end of six days fit four duty, (…) (t)he 
other was the best recovered of any in his condition” [Ibid.]. Lind’s ex-
periments provided evidence that citrus fruits could cure scurvy. He said 
that oranges and lemons are “the most effectual and experienced reme-
dies to remove and prevent this fatal calamity” [Ibid. p. 157]. 
Though Lind had identified a difference-maker, he was sidetracked 
by looking for the cause of scurvy, which he found in the moisture in the 
air, though he did admit that that diet may be a secondary cause of scur-
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vy [cf. Bartholomew (2002); Carpenter (2012)]. But in 1793 his follower, 
Sir Gilbert Blane, who was the personal physician to the admiral of the 
British fleet, persuaded the captain of HMS Suffolk to administer a mix-
ture of two-thirds of an ounce of lemon juice with two ounces of sugar 
poured to each sailor on board. As Blane reported the warship “was 
twenty-three weeks and one day on the passage, without having any 
communication with the land (…) without losing a man” [quoted by 
Brown (2003), p. 222]. To be sure, scurvy did appear, but it was quickly 
relieved by an increase in the lemon juice ration. When in 1795 Blane 
was appointed a commissioner to the Sick and Hurt Board, he persuaded 
the Admiralty to issue lemon juice as a daily ration aboard all Royal Navy 
ships. He wrote: “The power [lemon juice] possesses over this disease is 
peculiar and exclusive, when compared to all the other alleged remedies” 
[cf. op.cit.]. But even when it was more generally accepted that citrus 
fruits prevent scurvy, it was the acid that was believed to cure scurvy. 
The first breakthrough took place in 1907 when two Norwegian phy-
sicians, Axel Holst and Theodor Frølich, looked for an animal model of 
beriberi disease. They fed guinea pigs with a diet of grains and flour and 
found out, to their surprise, that they developed scurvy. They found a way 
to cure scurvy by feeding the guinea pigs with a diet of fresh foods. This 
was a serendipitous event. Most animals are able to synthesise vitamin C; 
but not guinea pigs. In 1912, in a study of the etiology of deficiency diseas-
es, Casimir Funk suggested that deficiency diseases (such as beriberi and 
scurvy) “can be prevented and cured by the addition of certain preventive 
substances”. He added that “the deficient substances, which are of the na-
ture of organic bases, we will call ‘vitamines’; and we will speak of a beri-
beri or scurvy vitamine, which means, a substance preventing the special 
disease” [Funk (1912), p. 342]. By the 1920s, the ‘anti-scurvy vitamine’ was 
known as ‘C factor’ or ‘anti-scorbutic substance’ [cf. Hughes (1983)]. In 
1927, Hungarian biochemist Szent-Györgyi isolated a sugar-like molecule 
from adrenals and citrus fruits, which he called ‘hexuronic acid’. Later on, 
Szent-Györgyi showed that the hexuronic acid was the sought-after anti-
scorbutic agent. The substance was renamed ‘ascorbic acid’. In parallel with 
Szent-Györgyi’s work, Charles King and W. A. Waugh identified, in 1932, 
vitamin C. The suggestion that hexuronic acid is identical with vitamin C 
was made in 1932, in papers by King and Waugh and by J. Tillmans and P. 
Hirsch [cf. Hughes (1983)]. 
The breakthrough in scurvy prevention occurred when scientists 
started to look for what has been called ‘the mediator’, which is a code-
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word for the ‘mechanism’, which “transmits the effect of the treatment to 
the outcome” [Pearl & Mackenzie (2018), p. 270)]. As Baron and Kenny 
put it, mediation “represents the generative mechanism through which the 
focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of 
interest” [Baron and Kenny (1986), p. 1173]. This mechanism, however, is 
nothing over and above a network of difference-makers: Citrus Fruits → 
Vitamin C → Scurvy. One such difference-maker, citrus fruits, was identi-
fied by Lind and later on by Blane. This explains the success in preventing 
scurvy after citrus fruits were administered as part of the diet of sailors. It 
is noteworthy, however, that Lind and the early physicians did not look for 
the mediating factor in the case of scurvy. As Bartholomew (2002), p. 696, 
notes, Lind did not try to isolate a single common constituent in citrus 
fruits in particular and in fruit in general which makes a difference to the 
incidence of scurvy. Instead he was trying to find out the contribution of 
different sorts of vegetable to the relief from scurvy. Still, even without 
knowing the mediating variable (vitamin C), the intake of citrus in a diet 
did make a difference to scurvy relief.  
In order to find the difference-maker in the case of vitamin C defi-
ciency it was necessary to find a model (animals) that does not synthesise 
its own vitamin C. In the late 1920a, Szent-Györgyi and his collaborator J. 
L. Svirbely used the recently isolated by Szent-Györgyi hexuronic acid to 
treat the animals in controlled experiments with guinea pigs. They divided 
the animals into two groups. In one the animals were fed with food en-
riched with hexuronic acid, while in the other the animals received boiled 
food. The first group flourished while the other developed scurvy. Svirbely 
and Szent-Györgyi decided that hexuronic acid was the cause of scurvy re-
lief and they renamed it ascorbic acid. Ascorbic acid was the sought-after 
mediating variable: the difference-maker [cf. Schultz (2002).  
It is useful to discuss the case of scurvy in relation to what has be-
come known in the recent philosophical literature on mechanisms as the 
Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT) ([Russo & Williamson (2007)], i.e. that 
in the health sciences, in order to establish a causal connection between 
A and B, one needs evidence both for the existence of a difference-
making relation between A and B and of a mechanism linking A to B. 
Williamson (2011) relies on this thesis to raise a problem for mechanistic 
and difference-making theories of causation. The problem is supposed to 
be that these theories, taken on their own, are not compatible with the 
causal epistemology adopted in biomedicine and other scientific fields, 
which conforms to RWT. 
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This argument seems to raise a problem for the difference-making 
account of mechanism presented in the beginning of this section. If A 
causes B in virtue of a mechanism linking A to B, where a mechanism 
involves a chain of events linked by difference-making relations, it seems 
that evidence of difference-making is enough to establish a causal claim, 
contrary to what RWT asserts. In other words, ‘mechanistic’ evidence 
need not be different in kind from difference-making evidence. Howev-
er, Williamson & Wilde (2016) assume that there is a distinction between 
these two kinds of evidence. They think that “in order to establish that 
A is a cause of B there would normally have to be evidence both that (i) 
there is an appropriate sort of difference-making relationship (or chain 
of difference-making relationships) between A and B — for example, 
that A and B are probabilistically dependent, conditional on B’s other 
causes —, and that (ii) there is an appropriate mechanistic connection (or 
chain of mechanisms) between A and B — so that instances of B can be 
explained by a mechanism which involves A” [Ibid. p. 38]. 
In contrast to this, the case of scurvy shows that looking for mech-
anistic evidence is just looking for a special kind of ‘difference-making’ 
evidence and not for a different kind of evidence. This special differ-
ence-making evidence involves looking for the ‘mediator’. As we have 
seen, Lind’s experiments provided evidence for a difference-making rela-
tionship between Citrus Fruits and Scurvy, but no evidence about how 
exactly Citrus Fruits acted so as to prevent scurvy. When it was realised 
by Funk that scurvy is a ‘deficiency disease’, i.e. it was produced because 
of the lack of a particular substance, it became obvious that Citrus Fruits 
acted to prevent Scurvy by providing that preventive substance. So, sci-
entists started looking for this preventive substance that was the mediat-
ing factor between Citrus Fruits and Scurvy. As we have already seen, 
however, what was required for finding the mediator and establishing the 
pathway Citrus Fruits → Vitamin C → Scurvy, was the isolation of a 
substance (hexuronic acid) from citrus fruits that was such as to prevent 
scurvy in controlled experiments with guinea pigs by Svirbely and Szent-
Györgyi. So, the evidence for identifying the mediator was not evidence 
about particular entities engaging in activities, or some sui generis type of 
mechanistic evidence, as one would have believed if the activities-based 
account of mechanism were true; it was evidence about more difference-
making relations, this time between the two initial variables (Citrus Fruits 
and Scurvy) and the mediating variable Vitamin C.  
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The case of scurvy thus shows that RWT can be accepted, without 
being committed to the existence of a special type of ‘mechanistic’ evi-
dence over and above difference-making relations. Moreover, acceptance 
of RWT does not automatically lead to a rejection of a difference-making 
account of causation. Given a difference-making account of mechanisms, 
RWT can be understood as follows: typically, to establish a causal connec-
tion between A and B, we have to have both evidence for a difference-
making relation between A and B, and evidence for one or more media-
tors; but all this evidence is, ultimately, evidence for difference-making re-
lations. In his (2011), Gillies offers a similar formulation for RWT. He 
suggests: “In order to establish that A causes B, observational statistical ev-
idence does not suffice. Such evidence needs to be supplemented by inter-
ventional evidence, which can take the form of showing that there is a 





In this paper we have defended the view that mechanisms are un-
derpinned by networks of difference-making relations and have shown 
that difference-making is more fundamental than production in under-
standing mechanistic causation. Our argument was two-fold. First, we 
have argued against the view that the productivity of mechanisms re-
quires thinking of them as involving activities, qua a different ontic cate-
gory. We have criticised two different routes to activities: Glennan’s top-
down metaphysics-first approach and Illari and Williamson’s bottom-up 
science-first approach. Second, we have looked in some detail at the his-
tory of the case of scurvy prevention, in order to illustrate the difference-
making account of mechanisms and to argue that mechanistic evidence 
in science is evidence about difference-making relations. The search for 
mechanisms is clearly a pervasive feature of science; but it is nothing else 
than the search for stable causal pathways.  
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1 This section is an expanded and reworked version of Psillos (2018). 
2 Hill’s influential (1965) has been viewed as offering a version of RWT 
[cf. Russo & Williamson (2007); Clarke et al. (2014)]. Note, however, that he 
does not talk explicitly about mechanisms in his paper. He offers ‘plausibility’ as 
a criterion for establishing causal claims, which can be understood as the exist-
ence of a biologically plausible mechanism; but he does not regard it as particu-
larly important, since “[w]hat is biologically plausible depends upon the 
biological knowledge of the day” [Hill (1965), p. 298]. As ‘strongest support’ for 
causation he takes experimental evidence, e.g. whether some preventive action 
does in fact prevent the appearance of a disease. Lastly, his ‘Coherence’ criterion 
involves, among others, establishing a mediator; his example is “histopathologi-
cal evidence from the bronchial epithelium of smokers and the isolation from 
cigarette smoke of factors carcinogenic for the skin of laboratory animals” 
[Ibid.], which was important in establishing a causal connection between smok-
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